Abstract Email spam is one of the major problems of the today's Internet, bringing financial damage to companies and annoying individual users. Among the approaches developed to stop spam, filtering is an important and popular one. In this paper we give an overview of the state of the art of machine learning applications for spam filtering, and of the ways of evaluation and comparison of different filtering methods. We also provide a brief description of other branches of anti-spam protection and discuss the use of various approaches in commercial and non-commercial anti-spam software solutions.
pornography, pyramid schemes, etc. (Moustakas et al. 2005) . The total worldwide financial losses caused by spam in 2005 were estimated by Ferris Research Analyzer Information Service at $50 billion (FerrisResearch 2005) .
Lately, Goodman et al. (2007) presented an overview of the field of anti-spam protection, giving a brief history of spam and anti-spam and describing major directions of development. They are quite optimistic in their conclusions, indicating learning-based spam recognition, together with anti-spoofing technologies and economic approaches, as one of the measures which together will probably lead to the final victory over email spammers in the near future. Presently, according to the study by Siponen and Stucke (2006) about the use of different kinds of anti-spam tools and techniques in companies, filtering is the most popular way of protection from spam. This shows that spam filtering is, and is likely to remain, an important practical application of machine learning.
In this paper we give a structured overview of the existing learning-based approaches to spam filtering. One section describes the spam phenomenon, including a brief overview of non-filtering techniques, which we think is necessary for understanding the context in which a spam filter works. Our survey gives a systematic guide to the present state of the literature, considering a wide scope of papers, and being thus complementary to the work of Goodman et al. (2007) , who present a concise account of the history of anti-spam protection and the directions of future development. An overview of email classification, including spam filtering, was previously given by Wang and Cloete (2005) . Compared to their work, we overview a much wider variety of filtering techniques and pay more attention to evaluation and comparison of different approaches in the literature.
The survey does not intend to cover neighboring topics, being devoted to protection from email spam. In particular, we do not address the issue of viruses delivered by spam, because we believe that this two problems, namely spam and viruses, are always distinguishable enough to be discussed separately: a virus can be recognized as such without reference to the way of delivery of it, and a spam message can be recognized as such both with and without malicious content. Also, we focus on the email spam, not on spam in general. Though the spam delivered through instant messengers, blog comments or systems of voice transmission pursues similar goals, the technical differences are significant enough to make the problem of spam in general too complex for one overview (see, for example, the paper by Park et al. (2006) for discussion of differences between email and voice spam).
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 is an introduction to the phenomenon of spam, including a brief overview of anti-spam efforts not based on filtering; Sect. 3 is dedicated to the methods of machine learning used for spam filtering; Sect. 4 overviews evaluation and comparison methods; finally, Sect. 5 is a conclusion. "Appendix A" contains an overview of existing practical solutions.
The spam phenomenon
This section provides an introduction to the phenomenon of spam, including the definition and general characteristics of spam, as well as a brief overview of non-filtering methods of anti-spam protection, namely anti-spam legislation and changes in the process of email transmission. Not being directly related to spam filtering, this methods either influence the ways in which spam can be formed and transmitted, or provide new architectures in which a filter can be used. Therefore, a brief introduction to this methods is needed before passing to filtering itself.
Definition and general characteristics of spam
There exist various definitions of what spam (also called junk mail) is and how it differs from legitimate mail (also called non-spam, genuine mail or ham). The shortest among the popular definitions characterizes spam as "unsolicited bulk email" (Androutsopoulos et al. 2000b; SPAMHAUS 2005) . Sometimes the word commercial is added, but this extension is debatable. The TREC Spam Track relies on a similar definition: spam is "unsolicited, unwanted email that was sent indiscriminately, directly or indirectly, by a sender having no current relationship with the user" (Cormack and Lynam 2005a) . Another widely accepted definition states that "Internet spam is one or more unsolicited messages, sent or posted as part of a larger collection of messages, all having substantially identical content" (SpamDefined 2001) . Direct Marketing Association proposed to use the word "spam" only for messages with certain kinds of content, such as pornography, but this idea met no enthusiasm, being considered an attempt to legalize other kinds of spam (SPAMHAUS 2003) . As we can see, the common point is that spam is unsolicited, according to a widely cited formula "spam is about consent, not content" (SPAMHAUS 2005) . It is necessary to mention that the notion of being unsolicited is hard to capture. In fact, despite the wide agreement on this type of definitions the filters have to rely on content and ways of delivery of messages to recognize spam from legitimate mail. Among the latest work it is interesting to mention Zinman and Donath (2007) , who still prefer to rely on content and a user's personal judgement to define spam.
There is a growing scientific literature addressing the characteristics of the spam phenomenon. In general, spam is used to advertise different kinds of goods and services, and the percentage of advertisements dedicated to a particular kind of goods or services changes over time (Hulten et al. 2004) . Quite often spam serves the needs of online frauds. A special case of spamming activity is phishing, namely hunting for sensitive information (passwords, credit card numbers, etc.) by imitating official requests from a trusted authorities, such as banks, server administration or service providers (Drake et al. 2004) . Another type of malicious spam content are viruses (Lugaresi 2004) . Sometimes a massive spam attack can be used also to upset the work of a mail server (Nagamalai et al. 2007 ). To sum up, the sender of a spam message pursues one of the following tasks: to advertise some goods, services, or ideas, to cheat users out of their private information, to deliver malicious software, or to cause a temporary crash of a mail server. From the point of view of content spam is subdivided not just into various topics but also into several genres, which result from simulating different kinds of legitimate mail, such as memos, letters, and order confirmations (Cukier et al. 2006) . Characteristics of spam traffic are different from those of legitimate mail traffic, in particular legitimate mail is concentrated on diurnal periods, while spam arrival rate is stable over time (Gomes et al. 2004) . Spammers usually mask their identity in different ways when sending spam, but they often do not when they are harvesting email addresses on websites, so recognition of harvesting activities can help to identify spammers (Prince et al. 2005) . A very important fact is that spammers are reactive, namely they actively oppose every successful anti-spam effort (Fawcett 2003) , so that performance of a new method usually decreases after its deployment. Pu and Webb (2006) analyze the evolution of spamming techniques, showing that methods of constructing spam become extinct if filters are effective enough to cope with them or if other successful efforts are taken against them. A study of network-level behavior of spammers by Ramachandran and Feamster (2006) showed that the majority of spam comes from a few concentrated parts of IP address space, and that a small subset of sophisticated spammers use temporary route announcements in order to remain untraceable.
Anti-spam legislation efforts
The huge and various damage caused by spam, including financial loss and violation of laws by broadcasting prohibited materials, resulted in the need for a legislative response. Noticeable efforts in this field are EU Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive, and US CAN-SPAM Act.
The European Parliament passed the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002/58/EC in July 2002. The directive prohibits unsolicited commercial communication unless "prior explicit consent of the recipients is obtained before such communications are addressed to them". An overview of the directive is given by Lugaresi (2004) . In case of Italy, in particular, Section 130 of "Personal Data Protection Code" (Legislative Decree no. 196 of 30 June 2003) 1 states that "the use of automated calling systems without human intervention for the purposes of direct marketing or sending advertising materials, or else for carrying out market surveys or interactive business communication shall only be allowed with the userć6s consent".
US CAN-SPAM Act (Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act) of 2003 allows unsolicited commercial email, but places several restrictions on it. In particular, it demands to include a physical address of the advertiser and an opt-out link in each message, to use legitimate return email address, and to mark the messages clearly as advertisements, and prohibits to use descriptive subject lines, to falsify header information, to harvest email addresses on the Web, and to use illegally captured third-party computers to relay the messages. Grimes (2007) shows, that the actual compliance with the CAN-SPAM act was low from the very beginning and became even lower in the following years, being equal to about 5.7% in 2006.
For more information on this topic, one may refer to an analysis of the EU and the US anti-spam legislation by Moustakas et al. (2005) , and to an overview of anti-spam legislation of different countries prepared by the International Telecommunication Union (2005).
Modifying email transmission protocols
One of the proposed ways of stopping spam is to enhance or even substitute the existing standards of email transmission by new, spam-proof variants. The main drawback of the commonly used Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is that it provides no reliable mechanism of checking the identity of the message source. Overcoming this disadvantage, namely providing better ways of sender identification, is the common goal of Sender Policy Framework (SPF, formerly interpreted as Sender Permitted From) ( SPF 2006) , Designated Mailers Protocol (DMP) Fecyk (2003) , Trusted E-Mail Open Standard (TEOS) Schiavone et al. (2003) , and SenderID (sometimes also spelled Sender ID) Sender ID (2004) . A comparison and discussion of this kind of proposals is given by Levine and DeKok (2004) . SenderID, being released in 2004, has grown quite popular already. According to Goodman et al. (2007) , almost 40% of legitimate email is today SenderID-compliant. The principle of its work is the following: the owner of a domain publishes the list of authorized outbound mail servers, thus allowing recipients to check, whether a message which pretends to come from this domain really originates from there. A discussion of the problem of fake IP addresses in email messages and ways of overcoming it by changes in standards is given by Goodman (2004) .
The idea underlying another group of proposals to amend the existing protocols is to add a step to the mail sending process that represents a minor obstacle for sending few emails, but a major one for sending great number of messages. Efforts in this direction were made already in 1992 (Dwork and Naor 1992) , when it was proposed to ask sender to compute a moderately hard function before granting him the permission to sent a message. Another proposal (Seltzer 2003) was to establish a small payment for sending an email message, neglible for a common user, but big enough to prevent a spammer to broadcast millions of messages. An interesting version of this approach is Zmail protocol (Kuipers et al. 2005) , where a small fee is paid by the sender to the receiver, so that a common user who sends and receives nearly equal amount of messages gets neither damage no profit from using email, while spamming becomes a costly operation. Another approach is to use simple tests that allow the system to distinguish human senders from robots (CAPTCHA 2005) , for example to ask the user to answer a moderately easy question before sending the message. One disadvantage of this approach is that such protection is annoying to human senders. Duan et al. (2005) propose to use a differentiated email delivery architecture to handle messages from different classes of senders in different ways. For example, for some classes messages are kept on the sender's mail server until the receiver asks to transmit them to him.
Local changes in email transmission process
Some solutions do not require global protocol changes but propose to manage email in a different way locally. Li et al. (2004) and Saito (2005) propose slowing down the operations with messages that are likely to be spam. A similar idea is discussed in the technical report by Twining et al. (2004) , who propose to use the past behavior of senders for fast prediction of message category, and then process supposed spam in a lower priority queue and supposed legitimate mail in a higher priority queue. In this way the delivery of legitimate mail is guaranteed, but it becomes hard to broadcast many spam messages at once. Yamai et al. (2005) pointed out that when a spammer falsifies the sender identity in the messages, the server corresponding to the falsified address receives a great number of error mails. Yamai and collaborators propose to solve this problem by using a separate mail transfer agent for the error messages. Goodman and Rounthwaite (2004) point to the possibility of controlling not only ingoing, but also outgoing spam, stopping it on the level of email service provider used by a spammer.
Learning-based methods of spam filtering
Filtering is a popular solution to the problem of spam. It can be defined as automatic classification of messages into spam and legitimate mail. Existing filtering algorithms are quite effective, often showing accuracy of above 90% during the experimental evaluation (see, for example, the evaluation performed by Lai and Tsai (2004) ). It is possible to apply the spam filtering algorithms on different phases of email transmission: at routers (see for example the paper by Agrawal et al. (2005) ), at the destination mail server, or in the destination mailbox. It must be mentioned that filtering on the destination point solves the problems caused by spam only partially: a filter prevents end-users from wasting their time on junk messages, but it does not prevent resources misuse, because all the messages are delivered nevertheless.
In general, a spam filter is an application which implements a function: 
where m 1 , m 2 , . . . m n are previously collected messages, y 1 , y 2 . . . y n are the corresponding labels, and is the training function.
According to Fawcett (2003) , the following peculiarities of spam filtering task cause problems from the point of view of data mining: skewed class distribution (the proportion of spam to legitimate mail varies greatly), unequal and uncertain error costs, disjunctive and changing target concept (the content of spam changes with time), and reactive adversaries. Another problem is the need for sufficient amount of training data. Addressing this issue, Chan et al. (2004) proposed to use semi-supervised learning, namely a technique called co-training, for spam filtering. This technique allows the learner to start off with a small amount of labeled training data, which is used for initial training of the classifier, and a larger amount of unlabeled training data, which is then labeled in an iterative process and used to train the classifier better.
For all the algorithms of email classification there exists the problem of finding a reasonable trade-off between two types of errors: classifying legitimate mail as spam and classifying spam as legitimate mail. While classifying several spam messages as legitimate mail just annoys the user, the opposite situation may lead to the actual loss of valuable information. A solution for finding a trade-off based on game theory is proposed by Androutsopoulos et al. (2005) . Also, Yih et al. (2006) propose and discuss two techniques of training filters with low false positive rates. Nevertheless, we must remember, that different users have different requests, so it is reasonable to consider the relative cost of the two types of errors as a user-defined parameter .
The development of a new filter can be simplified by some existing software tools. Here we can mention Spamato system (Albrecht et al. 2005 ) that provides a uniform user-friendly software framework for spam filtering algorithms in order to simplify practical implementation of new filters, and the Email Mining Toolkit (EMT) (Hershkop 2006) , a data mining toolkit designed to analyze offline email corpora.
What to analyze?
In order to classify new messages, a spam filter can analyze them either separately (for example, just checking the presence of certain words in case of keyword filtering) or in groups (for example, a filter may consider that the arrival of a dozen of substantially identical messages in 5 min is more suspicious than the arrival of one message with the same content). In addition to this, a learning-based filter analyzes a collection of labeled training data (pre-collected messages with reliable judgements), and a filter which involves user collaboration receives also multiple user judgements about some of the new messages for the analysis (Fig. 1) . An email message consists of two parts, namely body and header. Message body is usually a text in a natural language, possibly with HTML markup and graphical elements. Header is a structured set of fields, each having name, value, and specific meaning. Some of this fields, like From, To, or Subject, are standard, and others may depend on the software involved in message transmission, such as spam filters installed on mail servers. Subject field contains what the user sees as the subject of the message and is often treated as a part of the message body. The body is sometimes referred to as the content of the message. We must mention that non-content features are not limited to the features of the header. For example, a filter may consider the message size as a feature (Hershkop 2006) .
For each method of message analysis its designer must choose a way of doing feature extraction, namely decide what parts of the messages are relevant for the analysis. The simplest way of doing feature extraction is the 'bag of words' model, which represents the message as an unstructured set of tokens, namely sequences of characters separated by spaces 
Each measure applies to a feature M is the set of all training messages, c spam and c leg are the labels of spam class and legitimate mail class correspondingly, f i is a binary feature (for example "the word free is present in the message"), and ¬ f i is the negation of the feature f i (for example "the word free is NOT present in the message"). All the probabilities are estimated with frequencies and/or punctuation marks. This model can be used to characterize any part of a message, or a message as a whole. In this case, presence of a certain word in the message is considered a binary feature of the message. A somewhat more sophisticated approach is to consider the occurrences of the same word in different parts of the message (say, 'John' in the message body and 'John' in the 'From' field) as different features. This approach, though makes some use of the message structure, does not really exploit the differences between text in the body and technical information in the header, so further in the discussion we will make no difference between this approach and the plain 'bag of words'. Also a weighted variant can be used, when the features are not binary, but reflect the importance of the token in some way, for example the number of occurrences of the token in the message can be used as the weight of this token. It is possible to use all the features, or to select top N features by some measure. Zhang et al. (2004) name three measures that can be used to order the features: document frequency, information gain, and χ 2 (the definitions are given in Table 1 ).
Natural language processing provides some alternative ways of selecting features from the body. The simplest way is enhancing the 'bag of words' model with stemming (removing affixes) and/or stopping (ignoring the most frequent words). For the message header analysis, more sophisticated ways of selecting features take the header structure into account, extracting only some special kind of information. Yeh et al. (2005) propose a complex approach based on meta-heuristics, using knowledge about typical behaviors of spammers to specify features for recognizing spam (for example the "From" field empty or missing, or the date illegal or very old, are considered signs of spam message). Hershkop (2006) uses a wide range of non-content features, including features extracted from the header, such as sender and recipient email names, domain names and zones, and general characteristics of the message, such as the message size and the number of attachments.
Feature extraction for image-based filtering
Apart from text, a message can also contain graphical images. After the distribution of content-based filtering techniques, the spammers adopted the use of image spam. The text of an advertizement is placed in an image, so that it is impossible to analyze the message content with plain text-based filters. This led to the need for filters based on image analysis.
In image-based filtering the main issue is to find features both relevant and easy to extract, while the classification itself can be further perfomed by state-of-the-art algorithms.
The fully-functional optical character recognition (OCR) procedure is computationally expensive, so usually simplified models are proposed to recognize spam in images. In particular, Aradhye et al. (2005) extract five features from the images, namely the fraction of the image occupied by regions identified as text, and color saturation and color heterogeneity calculated separately for text and non-text regions. A similar approach to feature extraction for image-based filtering was proposed by Wu et al. (2005) . In addition to detecting the size and the number embedded text regions without actual text recognition, they characterize a banner as a special kind of image (very narrow in width or height, and with a large aspect ratio), and use the number of banner-like images as an additional feature. Lately, Dredze et al. (2007) introduced a new approach, which relies only on features which take very small time to extract, avoiding not only OCR, but in general any computations more complicated than simple edge detection. Thus, the features used in this work are selected among those that do not require image analysis at all (for example, file format, height and width of the image, or file size), and those that are retrieved through very simple analysis of images (for example, average color or color saturation). Similarly, Wang et al. (2007) use such fast-to-extract features as color histogram, orientation histograms, and coefficients of wavelet transformation of the image. All this methods showed reasonably high accuracy, but, as explicitly stated by Dredze et al. (2007) , such approaches are vulnerable to reactivity. It can be well seen on the example of features used to characterize banners, which can obviously be easily avoided by spammers and already today are unlikely to be helpful.
Despite the general desire to avoid OCR for the reasons of low speed, Fumera et al. (2006) note that it may be reasonable to apply OCR-based recognition in the rare cases when simpler filters are unable to provide a confident decision. They show that application of state-of-theart text categorization techniques to the text extracted from the images can be quite efficient. Providing positive results, they nevertheless observe that the spammers can easily react by applying techniques which will pose problems to OCR without decreasing human readability of text-ironically, the same techniques which are used in the tests designed to distinguish human senders from robots.
How to analyze?
The first filters were based plainly on checking presence of certain predefined tokens in the message body (keyword filtering) or in the information about the sender (blacklist/whitelist filtering). Though this approches are not themselves learning-based, it is necessary to mention them in the beginning of this section, because a great number of later filters are in fact sophisticated improvements of the same two initial ideas. While keword filtering was completely replaced by its learning-based descendants (primarly Naïve Bayes), blacklists and whitelists are used until now as parts of more complex anti-spam solutions ; apart from personal blacklists, the public up-to-date registers of known spammers exist (see for example Jung and Sit (2004) ) and are widely used. One more related method is greylisting (Harris 2003) , when a message which is neither in the whitelist nor in the blacklist is temporarily rejected; if an attempt of transmission on the same message is held later, the message is accepted. This method rests on the assumption that spammers do not always retry sending their messages, and those who do will probably be listed in public blacklists during the time gap between the two attempts.
Below we provide short descriptions of the existing filtering methods.
Methods based on Bag-of-Words model
Learning-based spam filters that treat the input data as an unstructured set of tokens, can be applied both to the whole message and to any part of it. For this group of filters we can state the problem as follows. Let there be two classes of messages: spam and legitimate mail. Let us then have a set of labeled training messages, each message being a vector of d binary features and each label being c spam or c leg depending on the class of the message. Thus, the training data set M, once pre-processed in this way, can be described as: y 2 ) , . . . , (x n , y n )},
where d is the number of features used. Then, given a new samplex ∈ Z d 2 the classifier should provide a decision y ∈ {c spam , c leg }.
Naïve Bayes. In 1998 the Naïve Bayes classifier was proposed for spam recognition (Pantel and Lin 1998; Sahami et al. 1998) . It became widely known and used due to Paul Graham's popular article "A Plan for Spam" (Graham 2002 ). This classifier, when applied to text, can be considered an improved learning-based variant of keyword filtering. It rests on the so-called naive independence assumption, namely that all the features are statistically independent. The basic decision rule can be defined as follows:
where x j is the jth component of the vectorx,P(y) andP x j = 1|y are probabilities estimated using the training data. Several variants of Naïve Bayes were applied to spam filtering, an overview and comparison of them can be found in the article by Metsis et al. (2006) . Though the classifier is very fast as it is, Li and Zhong (2006) proposed to make it even faster by using approximate classification techniques. Their version of the algorithm achieves significant increase in speed without loosing much in accuracy. Simple, fast and quite accurate, Naïve Bayes has extreme popularity with practical software solutions (see the "Appendix A"). k-Nearest neighbor. The k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) classifier was proposed for spam filtering by Androutsopoulos et al. (2000c) . With this classifier the decision is made as follows: k nearest training samples are selected using a predefined similarity function, and then the messagex is labeled as belonging to the same class as the majority among this k samples.
Support vector machines. Another classifier proposed for spam filtering is Support Vector Machine (SVM) (Drucker et al. 1999) . Given the training samples and a predefined transformation : R d → F, which maps the features to a transformed feature space, the classifier separates the samples of the two classes with a hyperplane in the transformed feature space, building a decision rule of the following form:
is the kernel function and α i , i = 1..n and b maximize the margin of the separating hyperplane. The value −1 corresponds to c leg , 1 corresponds to c spam . SVM was proposed in particular to classify the vectors of features extracted from images (Aradhye et al. 2005 ).
Lately two improvements of this method of filtering appeared. Sculley and Wachman (2007) proposed a version of SVM, called Relaxed Online SVM, which reduces greatly the computational cost of updating the hypothesis, in particular by training only on actual errors. Blanzieri and Bryl (2007) presented an SVM-based filtering algorithm which improves the accuracy by using locality in the spam phenomenon.
Term frequency-inverse document frequency. The name Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) actually applies to a term-weighting scheme, which is defined as follows:
where w i j is the weight of ith term (token) in the jth document (message), t f i j is the number of occurrences of the ith term in the jth document, d f i is the number of messages in which the ith term occurs, and n, as above, is the total number of documents in the training set. This scheme can be combined with the Rocchio algorithm, a detailed description of which can be found in the paper by Joachims (1997) . Such combination results in a quite accurate classifier (Drucker et al. 1999) , which is sometimes also referred to as TF-IDF in the literature.
Boosting. Boosting is a general name for the algorithms based on the idea of combining many hypotheses (for example one-level decision trees). At each stage of the classification procedure a weak (not very accurate) learner is trained, and its output is used to reweight the data for the future stages: greater weight is assigned to the samples which are misclassified. For spam filtering boosting was proposed by Carreras and Márquez (2001) .
Language-based filters
Another group of methods uses the fact that the message body is a text in a natural language. We must mention that methods discussed in this section can in practice be applied also to message headers or whole messages, however, the motivation proposed in the literature for their application on spam filtering relies on the fact that they are effective in natural language text classification. In fact, the same motivation can as well be applied to the methods based on compression models, namely dynamic Markov compression and prediction by partial matching, which were nevertheless successfully used with the data extracted from both bodies and headers of the messages .
Chi by degrees of freedom. This method, which is usually used for document authorship identification, is proposed for spam filtering by O'Brien and Vogel (2003) . First, messages are represented by character or word N -gram frequency counts. Then, the message in question is compared to the sets of known spam and known legitimate mail. For this purpose, the chi-by-degrees-of-freedom test is used. This test is calculated by dividing the value of the χ 2 test by m − 1, where m is the number of N -grams involved in the comparison.
Smoothed N-gram language models. Medlock (2006) used smoothed higher-order N -gram models. N -gram language models are based on the assumption that the probability of a certain word occurring at a certain position in a sequence depends only on the previous N − 1 words. The method builds separate language models for spam and legitimate mail, and then for each of the models it calculates the probability that the text in the message is generated by this model. These probabilities are further employed, using Bayes rule, to calculate the most probable class for the given message.
Filters based on non-content features
The methods based on structured analysis of the header and of meta-level features, such as number of attachments, use specific technical aspects of email and so they are specific to spam filtering.
Analyzing SMTP path. Leiba et al. (2005) present a filtering method based on analyzing IP addresses in the reverse-path and ascribing reputation to them according to amount of spam and legitimate mail delivered through them. Both this and the subsequent method can be viewed as development of the idea of blacklisting and whitelisting.
Analyzing the user's social network. The algorithm proposed by Boykin and Roychowdhury (2005) analyzes 'From', 'To', 'Cc' and 'Bcc' fields of the message headers in order to build a graph of social relations of the user, and then uses this graph in order to classify new messages. The idea of extracting the user's social network from his mailbox was further developed by Chirita et al. (2005) and by Golbeck and Hendler (2004) .
Analyzing behaviors. Behavior-based filtering rests on extracting knowledge about the behavior behind a given message or group of messages from their non-content features, and comparing it to predefined or extracted knowledge about the typical behaviors of malicious and normal users. Examples are the works of Yeh et al. (2005) , and Hershkop (2006) , both already mentioned in Sect. 3.1. Yeh et al. (2005) use well-known behaviors of spammers, such as using incorrect dates. Hershkop (2006) proposes a number of behavior models, among them recipient frequency and histograms of user's past activity, that are based on non-content features and can be used to detect spam and viruses as anomalies in the email flow.
Collaborative spam filtering
Certain efforts are made to achieve better spam filtering through the collaboration of users. The usual way of such collaboration is sharing the knowledge about spam between P2P users Lazzari et al. (2005) , Zhou et al. (2003) , or gathering spam reports from the users on a mail server (like in Google's Gmail). 2 In such situation of data exchange between users the issue of privacy arises. Damiani et al. (2004) propose a privacy-preserving approach to P2P spam filtering system. In particular, spam reports in their system are sent without indicating the user who is the source of the report. Mo et al. (2006) propose a multi-agent system for collaborative spam filtering, in which each message is first classified as spam, legitimate mail or suspicious mail by a local agent, and only for suspicious messages the collaborative judgement is requested. While usually the users are proposed to exchange opinions or information about emails, Garg et al. (2006) propose to exchange trained filters instead, thus significantly reducing the amount of data transmitted. Another interesting effort for collaborative spam fighting is Project Honey Pot (2004), intended to identify email address harvesters with the help of specially generated email addresses.
Hybrid approaches
We must mention that it is also possible to combine different algorithms, especially if they use unrelated features to produce a solution (Leiba et al. 2005; Zhang et al. 2004) .
Overview of the methods
In Table 2 we give a wide list of the spam filtering algorithms proposed in the literature. In the same cell of the table we group similar algorithms that are based on the same idea but may have some differences. For example, Drucker et al. (1999) use C4.5 decision trees as a weak learner for boosting algorithm, and Androutsopoulos et al. (2004) use regression stumps. Here we refer only to the articles directly related to spam filtering, but many of the listed methods were known and used for other tasks before. In particular we must mention that RIPPER and TF-IDF classifiers were applied to the similar task of email classification by topic as early as 1996 (Cohen 1996) .
Opposing reactivity
The methods of spamming are improving together with the methods of spam filtering. Spammers try to attack filters, namely to decrease filtering effectiveness. Following the systematization proposed by Wittel and Wu (2004) we can categorize attacks on spam filters in the following way:
-Tokenization attacks, when the spammer intends to prevent correct tokenization of the message by splitting or modifying features, for example putting extra spaces in the middle of the words. -Obfuscation attacks, when the content of the message is obscured from the filter, for example by means of encoding. -Statistical attacks, when the spammer intends to skew the message's statistics. If the data used for a statistical attack is purely random, the attack is called weak; otherwise it is called strong. An example of strong statistical attack is good word attack (Lowd and Meek 2005) .
The reactivity of spammers requires countermeasures from filter developers, so in the field of spam filtering a direction appeared which we may call opposing reactivity. For example, a popular trick of spammers is to misspell the most 'spam-like' words, for example writing 'vi@gra' instead of 'viagra'. A way to solve this problem using hidden Markov model is proposed by Lee and Ng (2005) . Also we can mention that the whole issue of image spam initially arose as a part of the problem of reactivity, and so the image-based spam filtering as such can be considered opposition to reactivity.
Method evaluation and comparison
The great number and variety of spam filtering methods results in the need for evaluation and comparison of them. The usual way of testing a filter is applying it to a corpus of previously gathered mail messages sorted into spam and legitimate mail. The most simple measure used to express the results of such testing is filtering accuracy, namely percentage of messages classified correctly (Lai and Tsai 2004) , which has the disadvantage of making no difference between false positives and false negatives. More informative measures are spam recall and spam precision. Androutsopoulos et al. (2000a) propose to use the relational cost λ of the two types of errors as a variable parameter, and introduce several new measures based on it: weighted accuracy, weighted error rate, and a total cost ratio (TCR). TCR is the relative cost of using the filter (and so having some false positives and some false negatives) to using no filter at all (and so having all the spam misclassified, but all the legitimate mail classified Table 3 gives the formulae of the measures named above. It is also possible to test a filter in real-life conditions. A straightforward way is to use it on one's mailbox or mail server. Nevertheless, such testing, having the advantage of using up-to-date data, is more time-consuming chose a period of 7 months to test their filter). Usually a previously known method is tested simultaneously in the same way to provide a quality baseline. The Naïve Bayes classifier is often chosen for this purpose. However, Naïve Bayes has already been shown to be outperformed by many other methods (see for example Carreras and Márquez (2001) , Zhang et al. (2004) , Chuan et al. (2005) ), so now a more accurate baseline method is needed, for example Support Vector Machines, as done by Sasaki and Shinnou (2005) (Table 4) . Some mail corpora are made publicly available by their editors. The list of public corpora is given in Table 5 . The properties of spam change with time, so the older a corpus is, the less the results can be accepted as an estimation of present real-world performance. We must mention here that the LingSpam corpus, being rather old, is still actively used, and this may lead to out-of-date performance results. Creation of new public corpora is slowed down by privacy issues: people are certainly unwilling to publish their private email. For this reason some studies use either corpora that are not publicly available (Leiba et al. 2005; Yeh et al. 2005) , or both private and public corpora (Cormack and Lynam 2005b; Lai and Tsai 2004) . One of the largest public sources of legitimate mail for experiments, the so-called Enron Corpus 3 Klimt and Yang (2004) , was made available during the legal investigation. The data from this repository was later included in the Spam Track 2005 corpus and Enron-Spam corpora. Being against publishing their legitimate mail, people usually do not object publishing spam from their mailboxes, so it is possible to collect a really large repository of pure spam. For example, SpamArchive project proposes over 220,000 spam messages for experimental needs.
Some studies are dedicated to comparison of more than two filters , Drucker et al. (1999) , Lai and Tsai (2004) , Zhang et al. (2004) . In particular, Lai and Tsai (2004) make a complex comparison of four different methods (Naïve Bayes, SVM, k-nearest neighbor, and TF-IDF) applied to different parts of a message and show that, at least on their corpora, analyzing the header usually gives better results than analyzing the body or the whole message. According to the results presented by Zhang et al. (2004) , the highest TCR is achieved by using both headers and bodies, but using header alone again leads to better results than using body alone. A comparison of 44 spam filters supplied by 12 groups of developers was performed on Spam Track 4 on the Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) in 2005. According to the final report (Cormack and Lynam 2005b) , the best performance was shown by one of the filters supplied by Jožef Stefan Institute and based on compression models ), able to achieve spam misclassification rate of 1.17% with false positive rate of 0.1%. Another method which showed high results was gradient descent of a logistic regression model . The method of testing used in this competition is different from the usual one. Instead of commonly used offline testing, when the corpus is split into training and testing data, on-line testing is used: each message is first classified by the filter and then added to the training data. In this way the testing process emulates the real-life situation where the user corrects the errors made by the filter, so that the amount of training data gradually increases. Cormack and Bratko (2006) discussed the differences between the testing approaches used in Spam Treck and other comparisons. They showed that, though there are important differences between batch and on-line evaluation, the methods which performed well on Spam Track also show good results being tested in a more conservative way. TREC Spam Filter Evaluation Tool Kit is available for download from the Spam Track website together with the data corpus. The approach used to create this corpus is described by Cormack and Lynam (2005a) . Competitions of spam filters were also arranged within TREC 2006 , 5 ECML/PKDD 2006 , 6 and CEAS 2007 There is a wide literature presenting comparison of small groups of filters, apart from the public competitions. In Table 6 we give a list of papers that present comparisons of two or more filtering techniques. In Table 7 we propose a systematization of comparisons of spam filtering methods presented in literature. Figure 2 represents the results of these comparisons. We must state here that accuracy and reliability of different comparisons presented in the tables may differ depending on data, ways of preprocessing, and peculiarities of methods of comparison. As a consequence, different comparisons cannot be combined in order to give some final judgement. For example, Leiba et al. (2005) show that pure SMTP-path analysis is An arrow from method A to method B with references on it means that A is outperformed by B according to the given article(s). An arrow is put only if there is an explicit claim on the relative performance of the two methods in the article. For references to the articles see Table 6 outperformed by Naïve Bayes on their repository, conversely Zhao and Zhang (2005) show that Rough Set Based Model outperforms Naïve Bayes on the data from Spambase database. Obviously, this information is not enough to judge the relative performance of SMTP-path analysis and Rough Set Based Model. For references to the articles see Table 6 Apart from the widely used accuracy measures, some other features are evaluated in different studies. Drucker et al. (1999) and Zhou et al. (2005) evaluate the classification speed. Boykin and Roychowdhury (2005) analyze possible countermeasures that spammers may take to cheat the filter. Androutsopoulos et al. (2000a) evaluate the dependence of performance on training data size and attribute set size. For Spam Track, Cormack and Lynam (2005b) use learning curves to see how filter performance changes with time if the user retrains the filter continuously by correcting most of the classification errors.
Conclusion
In this paper we discussed the problem of spam and gave an overview of learning-based spam filtering techniques. There is no common definition of what spam is, but most of the sources agree that the core feature of the phenomenon is that spam messages are unsolicited. Spam causes a number of problems of both economical and ethical nature, which results in particular in the attempts of legislative definition and prohibition of spam. An important feature of the phenomenon of spam is the reactivity of spammers, in other words active intelligent opposition to every useful anti-spam technique. Another feature is the changeability of spam, which results partly from the reactivity of spammers, but also from changing content of the spam messages. One of the issues related to reactivity, namely falsification of the sender's identity, is fought by means of protocol extension. A serious obstacle for such approaches is that a new protocol must be willingly accepted by a great number of users to become really beneficial. At present at least one such solution, SenderID, has gained reasonable popularity, thus starting to influence the situation.
The most popular and well-developed approach to anti-spam is learning-based filtering. The current state of the art includes many filters based on various classification techniques applied to different parts of email messages. Among the learning algorithms used for spam filtering, the Naïve Bayes classifier occupies a special place: combining high speed and simplicity with sufficiently high accuracy it became a sort of default filtering algorithm, serving as a base for many practical solutions. In the field of spam filtering the reactivity of spammers is noticeable, and attempts are made to predict and prevent the spammers' countermeasures. In general, local spam filtering has the drawback of solving the problem of spam only partially, because a filter saves user's time, but do not prevent resource misuse. The issue of changeability has no final solution yet, as it can be seen in particular from the necessity of frequent updates of databases in the commercial anti-spam software.
The great number of proposed filtering techniques causes the need for systematic evaluation and comparison. Efforts are made in this direction: evaluation methods and measures are proposed and repositories for testing are created, though the amount of experimental data publicly available is limited because of privacy issues. In the last years, the evaluation field became more systematic due to centralized contests of filters, such as the ones held within TREC, ECML/PKDD and CEAS conferences. Still, there exists no way to measure filter's stability against the reactivity of spammers. Apart from this, the increasing accuracy of the solutions will probably soon result in a situation where a big number of benchmark datasets will be required for real comparison of leading solutions.
From our overview of the field we can draw the following conclusions:
1. Spam filtering is quite effective, making the situation tolerable and thus probably being the cause of the slowness with which the useful protocol extensions are accepted by users. Because of the sufficient accuracy of the existing solutions, more attention is now given to narrower subtasks, such as analysis of image-based spam. 2. While the unbalancedness of data and the unequal error costs can be dealt with quite successfully, another peculiarity of the task, namely the reactivity of spammers, is a less formalizable and therefore more complex problem, and careful analysis of possible countermeasures is required for any new approach. The challenge to machine learning is to provide classification algorithms that are robust with respect to any variation of the data that can be enforced by spammers. As this ideal final goal seems to be unreachable as yet, in practice the providers of anti-spam techniques rather aim to be just more reactive then spammers, responding to new spamming techniques before they spread widely enough to change the balance. One of the aspects of that problem is the usefulness of the frequent updates of the training data, which motivates collaborative approaches.
A relevant issue is the influence of protocol-based and legislative approaches on the spam filtering problem. The increasing spread of SenderID gives hope that the issue of falsifying the message source will soon be finally solved, thus limiting the range of methods of message obfuscation available to spammers and contributing to the accuracy of methods based on the analysis of the information contained in the header. The legislative approaches, in their turn, do not seem to influence the situation significantly, and no crucial improvement is likely to come in the near future.
In conclusion, we can say that the field of anti-spam protection is by now mature and well-developed. Then a question arises, why our inboxes are still often full of spam? Reactivity of spammers plays a role surely, and so does the complex nature of spam data. But one more issue not to be underestimated here is that we usually do not protect against spam in all the available ways. In other words, one point which should always be remembered by server administrators and end users is that the anti-spam technologies should be not only designed and developed, but also deployed and used.
Appendix A: Commercial and non-commercial software solutions
Spam filtering is not only a subject of scientific research, but also a wide and well-established field of software development. Available commercial and non-commercial solutions combine different techniques of message filtering. Moreover, they use protocol extensions and are sometimes integrated into single software solutions with anti-virus protection. An overview of some products is given in Table 8 . The meanings of the column titles are as follows:
-Whitelists/blacklists: use of various personal and public blacklists and whitelists; -Managing replies: using additional mechanisms to ensure that replies to the user's messages are not classified as spam; -Using decoy accounts: collecting spam messages on decoy accounts for future extraction of fingerprints or rules; -Protocol extensions: support of protocol extensions intended to prevent falsifying the sender's identity or to ensure that a message is legitimate by asking the sender for confirmation; The meanings of the column titles are explained in "Appendix A". The addresses of websites are given in Table 9 Table 9 Addresses of the official websites of the products presented in Table 8 Product Website address Symantec mail security for SMTP http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/products/overview. jsp?pvid=845_1 -Anti-virus/anti-spyware : integrating an anti-virus and/or anti-spyware solution into the same product; -User collaboration: support of sharing data about spam among the users of the product; -Message analysis: methods of filtering more sophisticated than blacklisting and whitelisting; -Bayesian: Bayesian algorithm is used for message analysis, probably in combination with other techniques; -Image analysis: use of algorithms of analysis of graphical content; -Downloading updates: the product regularly downloads updates for its database from a server; -Price: the price of the product as given on the official site, as of May, 2007.
The table is based only on the explicit statements on the official websites of the products, and thus may be incomplete. It does not provide real performance comparison and is not intended to advice any choice between this products, but rather to show which techniques are used in practical solutions. We do not include the information about the effectiveness of the solutions into the table, because it is stated only for few products, and sometimes the accuracy is claimed to be 100%, which seems rather a marketing slogan than a piece of information that can be used for comparison (Table 9) .
We can see that practical solutions often combine various ways of blacklisting and whitelisting with more complex filtering methods. An interesting point is that many products use Bayesian filtering. The reason for this is probably the following: approaches based on Naïve Bayes, though shown by many studies to be slightly outperformed by other techniques, have the advantage of being very fast and fit for continuous on-line training.
